Stock repurchases: How firms choose between a self tender offer and an open-market program

摘要

In practice, open-market stock repurchase programs outnumber self tender offers by approximately 10-1. This evidence is puzzling given that tender offers are more efficient in disbursing free cash and in signaling undervaluation - the two main motivations suggested in the literature for repurchasing shares. We provide a theoretical model to explore this puzzle. In the model, tender offers disburse free cash quickly but induce information asymmetry and hence require a price premium. Open-market programs disburse free cash slowly, and hence do not require a price premium, but because they are slow, result in partial free cash waste. The model predicts that the likelihood that a tender offer will be chosen over an open-market program increases with the agency costs of free cash and decreases with uncertainty (risk), information asymmetry, ownership concentration, and liquidity. These predictions are generally consistent with the empirical evidence.