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Politicians' hometown favoritism and corporate investments: The role of social identity

机译:政治家的家乡偏袒和企业投资:社会认同的作用

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We investigate the effects of governors? hometown favoritism on the corporate investments of Chinese listed firms. Exploiting the exogenous distribution of governors? tenure in a difference-in-differences research design, we find that firms in an incumbent governor?s hometown make higher investments by 10.26%. This favoritism effect is more pronounced when any of the following are true about a governor?s hometown: has a culture background of high collectivism, has strong clan culture, uses a minor local dialect, or if the governor has strong clan ties. Additional analyses rule out the social ties generated through living or working experiences as an alternative explanation. Neither political connections nor self-interest incentives explain the effects of hometown favoritism. Furthermore, the increased investments are overall detrimental for investment efficiency.Our study contributes to the literature by applying the social identity theory in corporate research and provides novel evidence on how politicians? social identity affects corporate investment.We investigate the effects of governors? hometown favoritism on the corporate investments of Chinese listed firms. Exploiting the exogenous distribution of governors? tenure in a difference-in-differences research design, we find that firms in an incumbent governor?s hometown make higher investments by 10.26%. This favoritism effect is more pronounced when any of the following are true about a governor?s hometown: has a culture background of high collectivism, has strong clan culture, uses a minor local dialect, or if the governor has strong clan ties. Additional analyses rule out the social ties generated through living or working experiences as an alternative explanation. Neither political connections nor self-interest incentives explain the effects of hometown favoritism. Furthermore, the increased investments are overall detrimental for investment efficiency.Our study contributes to the literature by applying the social identity theory in corporate research and provides novel evidence on how politicians? social identity affects corporate investment. Crown Copyright ? 2021 Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译:我们调查州长的影响?乡村偏袒中国上市公司的企业投资。利用州长的外源分配?在差异差异差异研究设计中,我们发现在现任总督的公司中的公司们的家乡将更高的投资达到10.26%。当总督家乡的任何一项都是如下所面临的任何事情其他分析排除了通过生活或工作经验产生的社会关系作为替代解释。既不是政治联系也不是自我利益激励解释了家乡偏袒的影响。此外,增加的投资是对投资效率的总体损害。我们的研究通过将社会形式理论应用于企业研究中的社会形式理论,并提供了关于如何如何如何政治家的证据?社会身份影响企业投资。我们调查了州长的影响吗?乡村偏袒中国上市公司的企业投资。利用州长的外源分配?在差异差异差异研究设计中,我们发现在现任总督的公司中的公司们的家乡将更高的投资达到10.26%。当总督家乡的任何一项都是如下所面临的任何事情其他分析排除了通过生活或工作经验产生的社会关系作为替代解释。既不是政治联系也不是自我利益激励解释了家乡偏袒的影响。此外,增加的投资是对投资效率的总体损害。我们的研究通过将社会形式理论应用于企业研究中的社会形式理论,并提供了关于如何如何如何政治家的证据?社会识别会影响企业投资。皇冠版权? 2021由elsevier b.v出版。保留所有权利。

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