HARRY J. PAARSCH AND HAN HONG, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STRUCTURAL ECONOMETRICS OF AUCTION DATA (THE MIT PRESS 2006)

摘要

Auctions are widely used by private and public institutions to sell or buy a wide variety of goods in agriculture (vegetables, tea, fish, livestock, wine, flowers, tobacco), natural resources (gas lease, timber), utilities (electricity, spectrum waves), financial securities (treasury bills), antiques (stamps, memorabilia, art) and public goods (contracts for road and building construction), to name a few without mentioning the recent increasing success of web auctions such as eBay. It is not surprising that the wide availability of data sources has inspired empirical economists. Until the early 1990s, the empirical analysis of auction data has focused on testing some predictions given by the auction models as surveyed by Porter (1995) with the gas lease auctions. The reduced-form analysis faces two limitations arising from (i) the limited number of testable restrictions provided by auction theory and (ii) the reduced possibilities for drawing some policy recommendations. This has called for the development of the structural approach.