The Effect Of Internal Capital Market Of Korean Large Business Groups On Investment Efficiency

摘要

This study examines whether the effect of funding through internal capital markets on investment efficiency is differentiated by the incentives of controlling shareholders as measured by the divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights of controlling shareholders (hereafter, wedge). To empirically analyze hypotheses of this study, 1,189 firm-year observations were collectedfrom Korean firms listed on the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) belonging to a large business group designated by the Korea Fair Trade Commission over the periodfrom 2005 to 2012.The results of the analysis are as follows. First, we find that the magnitude of internalfunding, as measured by total payables to the related parties, is positively (+) associated with investment inefficiency.Second, the interaction variables of total payables to the related parties and the wedge have a significant positive (+) effect on investment inefficiency.In other words, the deterioration of investment efficiency due to the increase in total payables to the related parties was mainly caused by firms with a big wedge.This result suggests that the effect of internal capital markets on investment efficiency of large business groups may be differentiated by the wedge that is proxy of the controlling shareholder's incentive. This study provides additional evidence on previous studies on the investment efficiency of large business groups by considering both the internal capital market and incentives for funding using the internal capital market, which are important factors affecting the investment of large corporate groups.Also, the results of this study are expected to provide implications for the regulatory policy of large business groups which have recently become an issue in Korea.