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Norton and Passmore on Valuing Nature

机译:诺顿和Passmore重视自然

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Norton argues on pragmatic “Deweyan” grounds that we should cease to ask scientists for value neutral definitions of “sustainability,” developed independently of moral and social values, to guide our environmental policy making debates. “Sustainability,” like human “health,” is a normative concept from the start—one that cannot be meaningfully developed by scientists or economists without input by all the stake holders affected. While I endorse Norton’s approach, I question his apparent presumption that concern for sustainability for the future is at odds with and ought to trump concern for enhancement in the present of public opportunities to access the goods nature represents. I argue that the two are not separable in practice. I argue for Passmore’s position that unless we take care to enhance equitable access to the good and services nature represents in the present, we cannot succeed in promoting sustainability for future generations.
机译:诺顿在务实的“杜威”论据上辩称,我们应停止要求科学家提出独立于道德和社会价值观而提出的“可持续性”的中性定义,以指导我们的环境政策辩论。从一开始,“可持续性”就如同人类的“健康”一样,是一个规范性的概念—如果没有所有利益相关者的投入,科学家或经济学家就无法有意义地开发这种概念。在我支持诺顿的做法的同时,我质疑他的明显推论,即对未来可持续性的关注与之矛盾,并且应该超越对增加获取自然界代表的公共机会的关注。我认为两者在实践中是不可分离的。我为Passmore的立场辩护,除非我们注意提高当前获得的自然享受的商品和服务,否则我们将无法成功地为子孙后代促进可持续发展。

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