Closing arguments: evaluating naval challenges and capabilities in the Gulf

摘要

Iran presents Western analysts with a conundrum. On one hand, it appears to be making every effort to deserve the removal of sanctions and improve its trading capability. On the other, it uses anti-Western rhetoric, talks of threatening trade routes in the Gulf region, and continues to expand its naval force. There can be little doubt that it does so from a position of insecurity, but it has a proud tradition as a strong regional state, influence that is now reduced by Western powers, particularly the United States. This tradition is felt in the IRIN, whose junior officers only 3 5 years ago were training alongside their US, UK, and French counterparts in their respective naval colleges and later at sea. The position of relative weakness in terms of naval capability has been the strongest influence on Iran's naval doctrine, particularly since the end of the wars of the 1980s. The powerful inventory of fast, well-armed attack craft is likely to be in the vanguard of any asymmetric attack, while its submarine force and vast number of mines would cause serious damage to merchant shipping and threaten the security of the Strait of Hormuz. The threat is tempered by the perceived poor serviceability of much of the IRIN and IRGCN hardware, but there is still sufficient capability to mount a spectacular one-off attack. The IRIN and IRISL take the responsibility for developing and maintaining strategic partnerships outside the region, but some observers argue that such activities are not always for benign ends.