首页> 外文期刊>International Public Management Journal >OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR IN RENEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS: DATA ON PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES
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OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR IN RENEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS: DATA ON PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES

机译:公私合营与政府机构之间重新谈判中的机会行为:德国武装部队公私合营的数据

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摘要

This study analyzes survey data on public-private partnerships ( PPPs) of the German Armed Forces. The analyzed PPPs are unique in that the German Federal Ministry of Defence, a government institution, has a dual role as a main shareholder and a major customer. Drawing on these data, the present article analyzes how a government institution influences a PPPs set of objectives and shows that the conflict of interest with respect to monetary objectives between the government institution and the PPP as a whole is low in such partnerships. Furthermore, the article examines the opportunistic behavior of PPPs in contractual renegotiations where the government institution acts as a customer. The results show that, although such behavior indeed occurs, it does not concern monetary issues, since the government institution can control the monetary objectives of PPPs in which it is a main shareholder. Third, this study also analyzes and identifies certain exogenous factors that may influence the level of opportunistic behavior exhibited by the examined PPPs, providing evidence on the causes and effects of such behavior and indicating how it can be limited by the government institution.
机译:本研究分析了德国武装部队的公私合营伙伴关系(PPP)的调查数据。经过分析的PPP的独特之处在于,德国联邦国防部是一个政府机构,具有主要股东和主要客户的双重角色。利用这些数据,本文分析了政府机构如何影响PPP目标集,并表明在这种伙伴关系中,政府机构与PPP整体之间在货币目标方面的利益冲突很小。此外,本文研究了在政府机构充当客户的合同谈判中,PPP的机会主义行为。结果表明,尽管确实发生了这种行为,但它与货币问题无关,因为政府机构可以控制作为主要股东的PPP的货币目标。第三,本研究还分析并确定了可能影响所检查的PPPs表现出的机会主义行为水平的某些外在因素,为这种行为的成因和后果提供了证据,并指出了政府机构如何限制这种行为。

著录项

  • 来源
    《International Public Management Journal》 |2014年第3期|387-410|共24页
  • 作者单位

    Schumpeter School of Business and Economics, University of Wuppertal;

    Management Accounting and Control at the University of Stuttgart;

  • 收录信息
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 23:22:22

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