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首页> 外文期刊>Review of Pacific Basin financial markets and policies >The Impact of Sarbanes Oxley and Dodd Frank Legislation on Loan Loss Provisioning in US Banks
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The Impact of Sarbanes Oxley and Dodd Frank Legislation on Loan Loss Provisioning in US Banks

机译:Sarbanes Oxley和Dodd Frank立法对美国银行贷款损失供应的影响

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摘要

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 and the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) were passed to address weaknesses in the internal control environment of the firm. Elements of these Acts reduce risky behavior of financial institutions by reducing informational asymmetry with borrowers. An important element of managing earnings quality in financial institutions is the loss provision, an annual expense set aside for uncollected loan and lease payments. These Acts affect the selection of loss provision expense levels in distinct ways. Using a dataset of community bank financial information observed between 1998 and 2017, it is shown that banks experience a complementary effect between SOX and DFA on loss provision expenses. Improved governance procedures to establish policy responses to nonperforming loans result in reduced expenses, whereas reduced information asymmetry tends to enhance a moral hazard effect. These results show that incentives for firm growth, income, capital, and loan specialization under the SOX and DFA regulatory environments complicate the loan risk management process.
机译:2002年的Sarbanes-Oxley法案(SOX)和2010年Dodd-Frank Wall Street改革和消费者保护法案(DFA)被通过,以解决公司内部控制环境的弱点。这些行为的要素通过减少与借款人的信息不对称来减少金融机构的风险行为。管理金融机构盈利质量的一项重要因素是亏损规定,为未收集的贷款和租赁付款留出一年的年度费用。这些行为以鲜明的方式影响损失提供费用的选择。使用1998年至2017年间观察到的社区银行财务信息的数据集,显示银行在索X和DFA之间遇到互补效果,损失损失拨款费用。改善治理程序,建立对不完整贷款的政策反应导致费用降低,而减少的信息不对称趋于增强道德危害效应。这些结果表明,SOX和DFA监管环境下的公司增长,收入,资本和贷款专业化的激励使贷款风险管理进程复杂化。

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