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SHORT COMMUNICATION Cryptanalysis of a simple three-party password-based key exchange protocol

机译:简短的通信密码分析一个简单的基于第三方的基于密码的密钥交换协议

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摘要

In order to secure communications between two clients with a trusted server's help in public network environments, a three-party authenticated key exchange (3PAKE) protocol is used to provide the transaction confidentiality and the efficiency. In 2009, Huang proposed a simple three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (HS-3PAKE) protocol without any server's public key. By analysis, Huang claimed that the proposed HS-3PAKE protocol is not only secure against various attacks, but also more efficient than previously proposed 3PAKE protocols. However, this paper demonstrates that HS-3PAKE protocol is vulnerable to undetectable online password guessing attacks and off-line password guessing attacks by any other user.
机译:为了在公共网络环境中在受信任服务器的帮助下保护两个客户端之间的通信安全,使用了三方身份验证密钥交换(3PAKE)协议来提供事务机密性和效率。在2009年,Huang提出了一种简单的基于三方密码的认证密钥交换(HS-3PAKE)协议,该协议没有任何服务器的公钥。通过分析,Huang认为提出的HS-3PAKE协议不仅可以抵御各种攻击,而且比以前提出的3PAKE协议更有效。但是,本文证明了HS-3PAKE协议容易受到任何其他用户无法检测到的在线密码猜测攻击和离线密码猜测攻击的攻击。

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