War Pessimism in Britain and an American Peace in Early 1916

摘要

By offering a reinterpretation of an Anglo-American pact known as the House-Grey Memorandum, this article challenges prevailing views about British decision-making in 1916 in the months leading up to the Battle of the Somme. It argues that serious doubts that the war could still be won without American assistance were the defining characteristic of their deliberations. Owing to deep scepticism about the proposed offensive and severe worries about their financial resources, a majority of the key British civilian leaders were prepared to accept a compromise peace mediated by the United States. Yet these efforts failed primarily because of intrigue at the highest levels of British politics, hard-line Conservative opposition and serious diplomatic missteps by American President Woodrow Wilson. In the end, although doubting it would produce any meaningful results, the British civilian leadership allowed the Somme offensive to go forward only because of their failure to unite on another course of action to prevent it. Finally, this study significantly revises existing thinking about American diplomacy during this period by challenging prevailing notions of the practicality and rigidity demonstrated by U.S. leaders in their foreign policy.View full textDownload full textKeywordsWoodrow Wilson, Edward House, Edward Grey, House-Grey Memorandum, David Lloyd George, H. H. Asquith, Andrew Bonar Law, Battle of the Somme, First World WarRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; var addthis_config = {"data_track_addressbar":true,"ui_click":true}; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2012.702675