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Debt directors

机译:债务总监

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摘要

One anomaly in the new regulatory framework designed to make the world's biggest banks safe to fail is that in most instances only equity holders have a say on such institutions' boards. An IMF report says debt should have a voice too. This is not as revolutionary as it might sound. Many savings banks around the world, such as Spanish cajas or British building societies, have long had their depositors and other customers represented on their management boards to keep their lending policies in check. This could also make sense for systemically important banks given that so much of recent debt issued by such institutions has equity characteristics. These hybrid instruments - dubbed by some as "pre-funded rights issues" - either get wiped out or in effect become equity when a trigger point is reached.
机译:旨在使世界上最大的银行安全倒闭的新监管框架中的一个反常现象是,在大多数情况下,只有股权持有人才能在此类机构的董事会中拥有发言权。国际货币基金组织的报告说,债务也应该有发言权。这并不像听起来那样具有革命性。长期以来,世界各地的许多储蓄银行,例如西班牙的cajas或英国的建筑业协会,一直在其董事会中派有存款人和其他客户,以控制其贷款政策。对于具有系统重要性的银行来说,这也可能是有意义的,因为此类机构最近发行的大量债务具有股权特征。这些混合工具(有时被称为“预先筹集的供股”)在达到触发点时要么被消灭,要么实际上变为权益。

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  • 来源
    《International Financing Review》 |2014年第2061期|1-1|共1页
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  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 23:25:19

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