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Radio-Intercepts, Reconnaissance and Raids: French Operational Intelligence and Communications in 1940

机译:无线电拦截,侦察和突袭:1940年的法国作战情报与通信

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摘要

Mentioned in memoirs by a few former military intelligence officers, operational intelligence has had little attention in academic writing on the Second World War before Ultra's decisive contributions began in 1941-2. Especially neglected has been the fighting provoked by the German offensive in 1940 that cleaved through France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg and drove Britain off the Continent. This article tackles this gap, analysing the military intelligence/military operations interface on the French side. It assesses the contributions and shortcomings of radio-intercept intelligence, along with intelligence-gathering by air and ground reconnaissance (demonstrating that German air superiority imposed a 'battle blindness' on Allied commanders wanting intelligence on approach marches and formation switches more than a dozen kilometres into the German rear). It reveals that frontline infantry raiding - redolent of intelligence-gathering techniques familiar to veterans of 1914-18 trench warfare - was again widely employed. This proved a highly effective recourse, particularly during the positional battles on the Somme, Aisne and Oise in June 1940, filling intelligence gaps left by more technologically sophisticated but more fragile sources. The factors that kept formations fighting so as to inflict significant delays and heavy losses on the German assaults were robust communications networks (to convey operational intelligence fast enough to permit counter-manoeuvres based on it), and the preservation of French chains of command and control. When these key nodes collapsed, preventing the hard-won operational intelligence being deployed to coordinate French military resistance, the latter declined into a series of disjointed, directionless and unavailing acts of courage that could not exploit the several instances during the campaign when the Germans, too, were afflicted by battle fatigue, re-supply bottlenecks and morale wobbles.
机译:在一些前军事情报官员的回忆录中提到,在1941-2年Ultra的决定性贡献开始之前,作战情报在有关第二次世界大战的学术著作中很少受到关注。尤其被忽视的是德国在1940年发动的攻势,分裂了法国,比利时,荷兰和卢森堡,并将英国赶出了欧洲大陆。本文解决了这一差距,分析了法方的军事情报/军事行动接口。它评估了拦截无线电情报的贡献和缺点,以及通过空中和地面侦察进行情报收集(证明德国空中优势对想要进近行进和编队切换超过十公里的情报的盟军指挥官施加了“战斗失明”进入德国后方)。它表明,前线步兵突袭-放宽了1914-18年战trench中的退伍军人所熟悉的情报收集技术-再次被广泛采用。事实证明,这是一种非常有效的求助手段,尤其是在1940年6月的索姆河,埃纳河和瓦兹河的位置争夺战中,填补了技术上更为先进但又更为脆弱的情报来源所留下的情报空白。保持编队战斗以至于对德军的进攻造成重大延误和重大损失的因素包括强大的通信网络(以足够快的速度传达作战情报以允许以其为基础的反机动),以及保留法国的指挥与控制链。当这些关键节点崩溃时,阻止来之不易的作战情报被部署来协调法国的军事抵抗,后者陷入了一系列脱节,无方向和无用的勇气,无法在战役中利用德军的几个实例,同样,他们也饱受战斗疲劳,重新供应瓶颈和士气低迷之苦。

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