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Injunctions for Standard Essential Patents Under FRAND Commitment: A Balanced, Royalty-Oriented Approach

机译:FRAND承诺下的标准必要专利禁令:一种均衡的,以专利权为导向的方法

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This article investigates the controversial topic of using injunctive relief as a remedy for infringement of SEPs under FRAND agreements and seeks to contribute to the debate of under what circumstances a holder of an SEP may seek injunctive relief without breaching the agreement with the standard-setting organization. The article seeks to identify a suitable legal framework and legal doctrine for determining whether such a right exists by comparing a number of EU and U.S. approaches and doctrines. The article concludes that seeking injunction to prevent use of an SEP cannot be seen as abusive on a general level. There are several approaches that appear to be capable of balancing the main interests while taking into account the benefits of standards. In the EU competition law, in particular abuse of a dominant position of Art. 102 TFEU, has proven useful - the Court of Justice of the European Union recently handed down its decision in Case C-170/13 Huawei Technologies Co. v. ZTE Corp regarding the terms under which a patent holder may seek injunction for an SEP under FRAND, elaborating on the concept of a "willing licensee". European case law suffers from the lack of guidance on how to calculate FRAND royalty rates. U.S. case law appears to be better positioned for dealing with these issues from a royalty perspective - in the Ninth Circuit's decision in Microsoft v. Motorola, the calculation formed an integral part of the question of the right to seek injunctive relief. In common law systems, equity law (applied to patent law) has the potential of providing a balanced view, focusing on the behavior of the parties and a "willing licensee"; whereas, a contractual approach is theoretically questionable and not optimal for solving the issues related to the right to seek injunctive relief for standard essential patents under FRAND. The article also addresses the issue of balancing the interests of the parties under the proposed approaches.
机译:本文研究了一个有争议的话题,即使用禁令救济作为FRAND协议下的SEP侵权的补救措施,并试图为SEP持有人在何种情况下可以寻求禁令救济而未与标准制定组织达成协议的辩论做出贡献。 。本文力图通过比较一些欧盟和美国的方法和学说来确定合适的法律框架和法律学说,以确定是否存在这种权利。该文章得出结论,从总体上讲,寻求禁止使用SEP的禁令不能被视为是滥用。在考虑标准的好处的同时,有几种方法似乎能够平衡主要利益。在欧盟竞争法中,尤其是滥用艺术的主导地位。 102 TFEU已被证明是有用的-欧盟法院最近在案例C-170 / 13华为技术有限公司诉中兴公司案中下达了关于专利持有人可根据以下条件寻求SEP禁令的裁决弗兰德(FRAND),详细介绍了“自愿持照者”的概念。欧洲判例法因缺乏有关如何计算FRAND特许权使用费率的指导而受苦。从特许权使用费的角度来看,美国判例法似乎更适合处理这些问题-在第九巡回法院在Microsoft诉Motorola案中的判决中,这一计算构成了寻求禁令救济权问题的组成部分。在普通法体系中,衡平法(适用于专利法)具有提供平衡观点的潜力,着眼于当事方和“自愿被许可人”的行为;然而,合同方式在理论上是有问题的,并且不是解决与FRAND之下的标准必要专利寻求禁令救济权有关的问题的最佳选择。本文还讨论了在提议的方法下平衡各方利益的问题。

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