On the Security of BioEncoding Based Cancelable Biometrics

摘要

Proving the security of cancelable biometrics and other template protection techniques is a key prerequisite for the widespread deployment of biometric technologies. BioEncoding is a cancelable biometrics scheme that has been proposed recently to protect biometric templates represented as binary strings like iris codes. Unlike other template protection schemes, BioEncoding does not require user-specific keys or tokens. Moreover, it satisfies the requirements of untraceable biometrics without sacrificing the matching accuracy. However, the security of BioEncoding against smart attacks, such as correlation and optimization-based attacks, has to be proved before recommending it for practical deployment. In this paper, the security of BioEncopding, in terms of both non-invertibility and privacy protection, is analyzed. First, resistance of protected templates generated using BioEncoding against brute-force search attacks is revisited rigorously. Then, vulnerabilities of BioEncoding with respect to correlation attacks and optimization based attacks are identified and explained. Furthermore, an important modification to the BioEncoding algorithm is proposed to enhance its security against correlation attacks. The effect of integrating this modification into BioEncoding is validated and its impact on the matching accuracy is investigated empirically using CASIA-IrisV3-Interval dataset. Experimental results confirm the efficacy of the proposed modification and show that it has no negative impact on the matching accuracy.