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Incentive Mechanisms for Economic and Emergency Demand Responses of Colocation Datacenters

机译:托管数据中心的经济和紧急需求响应的激励机制

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Demand response programs have been considered critical for power grid reliability and efficiency. Especially, the demand response of datacenters has recently received encouraging efforts due to huge demands and flexible power control knobs of datacenters. However, most current efforts focus on owner-operated datacenters, omitting another critical segment of datacenter business: multitenant colocation. In colocation datacenters, while there exist multiple tenants who manage their own servers, the colocation operator only provides facilities such as cooling, reliable power, and network connectivity. Therefore, colocation has a unique feature that challenges any attempts to design a demand response program: uncoordinated power management among tenants. To tackle this challenge, two incentive mechanisms are proposed to coordinate tenant power consumption for demand response under two different scenarios. First, in the case of economic demand response where the operator can adjust an elastic energy reduction target, we show that there is an interaction between the operator and tenant strategies, where each side maximizes its own benefit. Hence, we apply a two-stage Stackelberg game to analyze this scenario and derive this game’s equilibria. However, computing these equilibria can be intractable with exhaustive search; therefore, we propose an algorithm to find the Stackelberg equilibria with linear complexity. Second, in the case of emergency demand response where a fixed energy reduction target must be fulfilled, we devise two incentive schemes with the distributed algorithms that can achieve the same optimal social cost. While the first algorithm is based on the dual-decomposition method that is suitable for nonstrategic tenants, the second one is designed for strategic tenants to achieve a unique Nash equilibrium of a bidding game. Finally, trace-based simulations are also provided to illustrate the efficacy of our proposed incentive schemes.
机译:需求响应程序被认为对电网的可靠性和效率至关重要。特别是,由于数据中心的巨大需求和灵活的电源控制旋钮,最近数据中心的需求响应得到了令人鼓舞的努力。但是,当前大多数工作都集中在所有者经营的数据中心上,而忽略了数据中心业务的另一个关键部分:多租户托管。在托管数据中心中,虽然有多个租户管理着自己的服务器,但是托管运营商仅提供诸如冷却,可靠的电源和网络连接之类的设施。因此,主机代管具有一个独特的功能,可对设计需求响应程序的任何尝试提出挑战:租户之间的电源管理不协调。为了应对这一挑战,提出了两种激励机制来协调租户的功耗以应对两种不同情况下的需求。首先,在经济需求响应的情况下,运营商可以调整弹性节能目标,我们证明了运营商与租户策略之间存在相互作用,双方都在最大化自己的利益。因此,我们应用了两阶段Stackelberg游戏来分析这种情况并得出该游戏的平衡点。但是,用穷举搜索很难计算出这些平衡。因此,我们提出一种算法来寻找具有线性复杂度的Stackelberg平衡。其次,在必须满足固定的节能目标的紧急需求响应的情况下,我们设计了两种具有分布式算法的激励方案,可以实现相同的最佳社会成本。第一种算法基于适用于非战略性租户的双重分解方法,而第二种算法则专为战略租户设计,以实现竞标游戏的唯一纳什均衡。最后,还提供了基于轨迹的模拟,以说明我们提出的激励计划的有效性。

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