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Strategy-Proof Online Mechanisms for Weighted AoI Minimization in Edge Computing

机译:边缘计算中加权AOI最小化的策略在线机制

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Real-time information processing is critical to the success of diverse applications from many areas. Age of Information (AoI), as a new metric, has received considerable attention to evaluate the performance of real-time information processing systems. In recent years, edge computing is becoming an efficient paradigm to reduce the AoI and to provide the real-time services. Considering the substantial deployment cost and the resulting resource limitation in edge computing, a proper pricing mechanism is highly necessary to fully utilize edge resources and then minimize the overall AoI of the whole system. However, there are two challenges to design this mechanism: 1) the priorities (or values) of the real-time computing tasks, critical to the efficient resource allocation, are usually private information of users and may be manipulated by selfish users for their own interests; 2) due to the time-varying property of AoI, the values of the tasks discount with time, making the traditional pricing mechanisms infeasible. In this paper, we extend the classical Myerson Theorem to the online setting with time discounting tasks values, and accordingly propose an online auction mechanism, called PreDisc, including an allocation rule and a payment rule. We leverage dynamic programming to greedily allocate resources in each time slot, and charge the winning user with a new critical price, extended from the classical Myerson payment rule. A preemption factor is further employed to make a trade-off between the newly arrived tasks and ongoing tasks. We prove that PreDisc guarantees the economic property of strategy-proofness and achieves a constant competitive ratio. We conduct extensive simulations and the results demonstrate that PreDisc outperforms the traditional mechanisms, in terms of both weighted AoI and revenue of edge service providers. Compared with the optimal solution in offline VCG mechanism, PreDisc has much lower computation complexity with only a slight performance loss.
机译:实时信息处理对于许多地区的不同应用程序的成功至关重要。信息年龄(AOI),作为一个新的指标,已经得到了很大的关注,以评估实时信息处理系统的性能。近年来,边缘计算正在成为减少AOI的有效范式,并提供实时服务。考虑到优势部署成本和所产生的资源限制在边缘计算中,适当的定价机制非常必要充分利用边缘资源,然后最小化整个系统的整体AOI。然而,设计这种机制有两个挑战:1)实时计算任务的优先级(或价值)对有效资源分配至关重要,通常是用户的私人信息,并且可以由自私用户自行操纵兴趣; 2)由于AOI的时变性,任务的价值随时间折扣,使传统定价机制不可行。在本文中,我们将经典的Myerson定理与时间折扣任务值扩展到在线设置,因此提出了一个名为Prepisc的在线拍卖机制,包括分配规则和付款规则。我们利用动态编程来贪婪地分配资源,每次插槽,并以新的批评价格为获奖用户充电,从经典的Myerson付款规则延伸。抢先因素进一步用于在新来到的任务和正在进行的任务之间进行权衡。我们证明了预先保证了战略证明的经济性质,实现了持续的竞争比例。我们进行广泛的模拟,结果表明,就加权AOI和边缘服务提供商的收入而言,预先超越传统机制。与离线VCG机制中的最佳解决方案相比,Predisc具有更低的计算复杂性,只有轻微的性能损失。

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