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Hospital Quality and Selective Contracting: Evidence from Kidney Transplantation

机译:医院质量和选择性签约:肾脏移植的证据

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Most private health insurers offer a limited network of providers to enrollees. Critics havenquestioned whether selective contracting benefits patients. Plans counter that they take qualityninto account when choosing providers. Using data on five plans’ networks for kidney transplantnhospitals, this study shows that in-network hospitals have better outcomes than out-of-networknfacilities. Conditional logit estimates using patient level data confirm this result: compared tonMedicare patients, privately-insured patients are more likely to register at hospitals with highernsurvival rates. Restricting choice has the potential to improve patient welfare if plans steer uninformednpatients to high quality hospitals and physicians.
机译:大多数私人健康保险公司为参保者提供有限的医疗服务提供者网络。批评者一直质疑选择性签约是否有益于患者。计划反驳说,他们在选择提供商时会考虑qualitynin。利用五个计划的肾脏移植医院网络的数据,这项研究表明,与非网络设施相比,网络内医院的结果更好。使用患者水平数据进行的有条件logit估计证实了这一结果:与tonMedicare患者相比,私人保险患者更有可能在存活率更高的医院进行登记。如果计划将不知情的患者引向高质量的医院和医生,那么限制选择有可能改善患者的福利。

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