How do investment patterns of independent and captive private equity funds differ? Evidence from Germany

摘要

Empirical literature emphasizes a positive contribution of private equity investors, which results from their combined provision of capital, monitoring, and management support. The aim of this study is to show that these previous results, which are based mostly on the analysis of US independent closed-end private equity funds, cannot be generalized since the private equity industry should not be treated as homogenous. We argue that it is necessary to distinguish between different types of private equity providers because their differing governance structures, strategic goals and experiences have a decisive influence on their value adding activities. The results of this study—which uses a data set of 179 German private equity-backed companies—are consistent with the conjecture that independent and corporate private equity providers tend to have a more pronounced role in corporate governance and monitoring of the companies they finance, than bank-dependent and governmental funds which often serve only as bridge investors.