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Political cycle and reported labour incomes in Italy: Quasi-experimental evidence on tax evasion

机译:意大利的政治周期和上报的劳动收入:逃税的准实验证据

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摘要

Tax evasion is a complex phenomenon affected by many factors and shaped by policymakers' and citizens' behaviours. Distinct claims about the acceptability of tax evasion between centre-right and centre-left coalitions have clearly emerged in Italy in the last decades. According to the ruling coalition, these different attitudes could have influenced tax compliance, affecting reported incomes of the self-employed, who have much more room to engage in tax avoidance or evasion strategies than employees. Using a longitudinal administrative dataset recording the entire working life of the sampled individuals, we focus on the period 1996-2005 (the only period when a complete bipartisan political cycle took place in Italy) and, following a difference in differences design and carrying out fixed effects estimates, we test whether self-employed earnings, compared to employees earnings, significantly changed after the change in the ruling coalition. We find a clear reduction in self-employed reported earnings when the centre-right coalition ruled.
机译:逃税是一个复杂的现象,受许多因素影响,并受决策者和公民的行为影响。在过去的几十年中,关于中右翼联盟和中左翼联盟之间逃税行为的可接受性的明确主张在意大利已经明显出现。根据执政联盟,这些不同的态度可能会影响税收合规性,影响据报自雇人士的收入,而自雇人士在从事避税或逃税策略方面比雇员有更多的余地。使用纵向行政数据集记录被抽样人员的整个工作生活,我们将重点放在1996-2005年期间(意大利唯一的一个完整的两党政治周期发生时期),然后根据差异设计和固定进行差异效果估计后,我们检验了执政联盟变更后,自雇收入与雇员收入相比是否有显着变化。当中右翼联盟统治时,我们发现自雇人士的报告收入明显减少。

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