Observer-based guaranteed cost control of Cyber-Physical Systems under DoS jamming attacks

摘要

Increasing attention has been paid to the security issues of Cyber-Physical Systems in recent years. In this paper, consider the case that a DoS jammer who has a limited energy budget and employs random attack strategy to interfere the wireless fading channels in a CPS, while the CPS does not know the DoS jammer's attack strategy. By defining a concept of working subcycle, two types of a random attack strategy which decided by the DoS jammer can be described in a unified framework. An attack-tolerant mechanism is established based on the stored packet in the corresponding receivers. By establishing an attack-tolerant mechanism based on the stored packet in the corresponding receivers and adopting an observer-based control method, a guaranteed cost controller is designed to ensure that the CPS under DoS jamming attacks is exponentially mean-square stable and the corresponding cost function value is less than a specified upper bound, and the design problem of the controller is converted into a solving of a convex optimization problem. Numerical examples are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed control method under different random attack strategies, finally. (C) 2019 European Control Association. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.