Copenhagen and Beyond - How to Provide the New Climate Deal with a State-of-the-Art Non-Compliance Mechanism

摘要

The article discusses perspectives for designing non-compliance procedures for the new post-2012 climate-change regime. Different multilateral environmental agreements are evaluated against the backdrop of their sanctioning system whilst the discussion prominently focuses on the Kyoto Protocol's non-compliance system - the Marrahech Accords.rnAccording to this assessment, this blend of different approaches as it was performed within the Marrakech Accords is in line with compliance theories and practical experiences with previous multilateral environmental agreements. A combination of coercive sanctions and facilitative measures is needed where parties are demanded for meeting tight commitments. The ameliorations which are considered indispensable in view of providing the post-2012 climate change regime with an effective sanctioning system, mainly concern procedural and organizational matters as well as its legal nature.rnThe article pleads for a simplification of the decision-making process on determination of non-compliance, providing for a directly-triggered sanctioning process. In addition, legally binding sanctions are necessary to apply public pressure on non-complying parties. Eventually, measures that guarantee a fast reinstatement of compliance are highly favourable due to the need of mitigating the greenhouse effect.