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Public and Private Enforcement of Corporate and Securities Laws: An Empirical Comparison of Hong Kong and Singapore

机译:公共和私人执法公司和证券法:香港和新加坡的实证比较

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Current scholarship emphasises the correlation between enforcement of corporate and securities laws and strong capital markets. Yet, the issue of how private and public enforcement may achieve the objectives of compensation and optimal deterrence remains controversial. While enforcement strategies have been studied extensively in the US and the UK, comparatively less attention is placed on Asia, where concentrated shareholdings are the norm. This study fills the gap by focusing on Hong Kong and Singapore, two leading international financial centres in Asia. Post Asian financial crisis of 1997, Hong Kong and Singapore have changed their laws to strengthen the private enforcement framework. Public enforcement activities have also been significant. The question is whether these reforms and enforcement activities succeed in reaching the afore-mentioned objectives. Based on our study of ex post enforcement actions, which are actions that may lead to sanctions (such as prosecutions or administrative proceedings) or compensation orders, arising from breaches of directorial duties and corporate disclosure violations involving listed companies from 2000 to 2015, we find that (1) public enforcement dominates over private enforcement; and (2) there are important, but limited, substitutes for private enforcement: securities regulators use public enforcement to obtain compensation for investors, and shareholders file requisitions to remove errant directors. We argue that: (a) there is a significant gap in enforcement strategies for directorial wrongdoing in Singapore; (b) for public enforcement of corporate disclosure violations, the beneficiaries of the compensation should be the investors (rather than the company) and the defendants should only be the errant directors (and not the company). Our study is relevant to those jurisdictions considering the powers of regulators and improving their enforcement framework.
机译:目前的奖学金强调了企业和证券法和强大资本市场的执法之间的相关性。然而,私人和公共执行如何实现赔偿的目标,最佳威慑仍然存在争议。虽然在美国和英国进行了广泛研究的执法策略,但在亚洲的关注相对较少,集中持股是常态。本研究通过重点关注亚洲领先的国际金融中心,填补了差距。亚洲金融危机1997年,香港和新加坡改变了其法律,以加强私人执法框架。公共执法活动也很重要。问题是,这些改革和执法活动是否成功地达成了上述目标。基于我们对前任执法行动的研究,这是可能导致制裁(如起诉或行政诉讼)或赔偿订单的行为,从违反2000年至2015年的上市公司违反上市公司的违规行为而产生的,我们发现(1)公共执法占私人执法; (2)私人执法的替代品非常重要,但有限:证券监管机构使用公共执行来获得投资者的赔偿,股东申请申请以消除错误的董事。我们争辩说:(a)新加坡的董事会不法行为的执法战略存在重大差距; (b)为了公开执行公司披露违规行为,赔偿的受益者应为投资者(而不是公司),被告应该只应成为错误的董事(而不是公司)。我们的研究与考虑监管机构权力的司法管辖区有关,并改善执法框架。

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