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A SURVEY OF LITIGATION OVER CATCH SHARES AND GROUNDFISH MANAGEMENT IN THE PACIFIC COAST AND NORTHEAST MULTISPECIES FISHERIES

机译:太平洋沿岸和东北多鱼类渔业捕获量诉讼和地基管理调查

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Government regulators and regulated businesses issue periodic alarms about the cost of environmental litigation in delayed decisions and burdensome response requirements. Litigation over commercial fishing in U.S. waters is no exception. The effects of litigation on the operations of the National Marine Fisheries Service have been the subject of internal investigations, National Academy studies, congressional hearings, and opinion columns. While lawsuits over endangered species, compliance with harvest limits, and consideration of environmental consequences have been part of the fishery management scene for decades, a more recent phenomenon involves challenges to federal catch share policy-the practice of limiting the pool of users who have access to take public resources. This controversial fishery management tool has been around since the early 1990s. Much has been written in economic and political journals about the policy, variously termed "catch shares," "individual transferable quotas," "limited access privileges," and "rationalization." Whatever one labels this grant of public resources to individuals the process has been legislated, regulated, litigated, and implemented An examination of the record of wins and losses, sources of claims, changes in regulation, and legislative reform reveals a twenty-year history of fine-tuning the rules of catch share programs. Early litigation over fundamental questions, such as whether a catch share permit created a property right, was addressed by Congress in legislative reforms enacted in 1996 and 2006. Challenges arose equally from environmental advocates, the fishing industry, and other entities. Federal fishery managers have prevailed in more lawsuits and in the substance of their decisions more frequently as the law included greater specificity. Like catch share programs, litigation is a tool. Agency hand wringing to the contrary, it is part of the system-not an indication that the system is broken.
机译:政府监管机构和受监管的企业会定期发出有关环境诉讼成本的警报,以延迟决策并增加繁重的响应要求。在美国水域进行的商业捕鱼诉讼也不例外。诉讼对国家海洋渔业局运作的影响一直是内部调查,国家科学院研究,国会听证会和意见专栏的主题。数十年来,针对濒危物种的诉讼,遵守捕捞限额以及对环境后果的考虑一直是渔业管理领域的一部分,但最近的现象涉及联邦捕捞份额政策的挑战,即限制有权使用的使用者数量的做法。占用公共资源。这种有争议的渔业管理工具自1990年代初就出现了。在经济和政治杂志上,有关该政策的文章很多,分别称为“捕获份额”,“个人可转让配额”,“有限访问权限”和“合理化”。无论将这种公共资源授予个人的标签是什么,该过程均已被立法,监管,诉讼和实施。对获利,损失记录,索偿源,法规变更和立法改革的检查揭示了20年来的历史。调整捕获共享程序的规则。国会在1996年和2006年实施的立法改革中解决了有关基本问题的早期诉讼,例如获取份额的许可是否创造了财产权。环境倡导者,渔业和其他实体同样面临挑战。联邦渔业管理人员在更多的诉讼中占据了主导地位,并且在他们的决定中更为频繁,这是因为该法律包含了更多的特殊性。与捕获共享程序一样,诉讼也是一种工具。相反,代理商手拧绞,它是系统的一部分-并不表示系统已损坏。

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