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Why regulators adopt voluntary programs: a theoretical analysis of voluntary pollutant reduction programs

机译:监管机构为何采用自愿计划:自愿减排计划的理论分析

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To explain why regulators continue to implement voluntary emission reduction programs (VP), this study presents a model with multiple polluting firms, a trade association, a regulator, and a legislator who sets a mandatory standard and is politically influenced by the trade association, a representative of the polluting firms. We show that the regulator can implement a voluntary program, which generates less social cost and more aggregate abatement than a mandatory standard. We also find that assigning the greatest importance to the abatement rates of individual firms generates the highest level of social welfare if the damage due to individual firms' emissions does not depend on other firms' emissions. However, the importance of the participation rate will increase relatively to the abatement rate as the damage due to individual firms' emissions becomes more sensitive to other firms' emissions.
机译:为了解释为什么监管者继续实施自愿减排计划(VP),本研究提出了一个由多家污染企业,行业协会,监管者和立法者制定的模型,该模型设定了强制性标准并受到行业协会的政治影响。污染企业的代表。我们表明,监管机构可以实施自愿性计划,与强制性标准相比,该计划产生的社会成本更少,总减排量更大。我们还发现,如果由于单个公司的排放造成的损害不取决于其他公司的排放,则对单个公司的减排率给予最高重视将产生最高水平的社会福利。但是,参与率的重要性将相对于减排率增加,因为单个企业排放造成的损害对其他企业的排放变得更加敏感。

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