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Integrated Demand Response programs and energy hubs retail energy market modelling

机译:综合需求响应计划和能源中心零售能源市场建模

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摘要

The present research aims to formulate competition in a retail energy market in the presence of an Integrated Demand Response (IDR) program to reduce prosumer costs and increase retailer profits. This gives prosumers more degrees of freedom to reduce their energy costs. The retail energy market includes retailers and prosumers equipped with an energy hub containing a boiler for producing heat and combined heat and power (CHP). Retailers aim to maximize profit, whereas prosumers seek to minimize their costs. Hence, a multi-leader-follower game with a bi-level program emerges in which the upper level deals with the profit maximization of each retailer while the lower level considers the cost minimization of each prosumer. The strategic behaviour of each retailer is modelled as a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) problem. Simultaneously solving all MPECs, which leads to an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC), determines the market equilibrium point. The equilibrium point is achieved using mathematical, analytical methods and linearization of nonlinear constraints by accurate techniques. Two different case studies are developed to investigate how the number of retailers influences the market equilibrium point. The first case includes two retailers, while the second case considers an increase in the number of retailers. The results demonstrate that with an increase in retailers' number, their competition increases, causing the prosumers costs to reduce. Furthermore, our results suggest the IDR impact on reduced prosumers cost and increased retailers profit. (c) 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译:目前的研究旨在在综合需求响应(IDR)计划的情况下在零售能源市场中制定竞争,以降低专业成本并增加零售商利润。这使得具有更低程度的自由度来降低其能源成本。零售能源市场包括配备有能量轮毂的零售商和制度,其中包含用于产生热量和综合热量和功率(CHP)的锅炉。零售商的目标是最大限度地利用利润,而制度则寻求尽量减少成本。因此,具有双级计划的多领导者跟随游戏,其中较高级别涉及每个零售商的利润最大化,而较低级别考虑每项制度的成本最小化。每个零售商的战略行为被建模为具有均衡限制(MPEC)问题的数学程序。同时解决所有MPEC,这导致均衡限制(EPEC)的均衡问题,确定市场均衡点。通过精确的技术使用数学,分析方法和非线性约束的线性化实现平衡点。制定了两种不同的案例研究,以调查零售商数量如何影响市场均衡点。第一个案例包括两个零售商,而第二种案例考虑了零售商数量的增加。结果表明,随着零售商数量的增加,他们的竞争增加,导致对减少的制度成本。此外,我们的结果表明IDR对减少的监督成本和增加的零售商利润增加。 (c)2021 elestvier有限公司保留所有权利。

著录项

  • 来源
    《Energy 》 |2021年第1期| 121239.1-121239.13| 共13页
  • 作者单位

    Iran Univ Sci & Technol Ctr Excellence Power Syst Automat & Operat Sch Elect Engn Tehran Iran|Iran Univ Sci & Technol Sch Elect Engn Tehran Iran;

    Iran Univ Sci & Technol Ctr Excellence Power Syst Automat & Operat Sch Elect Engn Tehran Iran|Iran Univ Sci & Technol Sch Elect Engn Tehran Iran;

    Iran Univ Sci & Technol Fac Ind Engn Tehran Iran;

    Lappeenranta Lahti Univ Technol LUT Sch Energy Syst Lappeenranta Finland|Shiraz Univ Technol Dept Elect & Elect Engn Shiraz Iran;

    Iran Univ Sci & Technol Ctr Excellence Power Syst Automat & Operat Sch Elect Engn Tehran Iran|Iran Univ Sci & Technol Sch Elect Engn Tehran Iran;

    Univ Vaasa Sch Technol & Innovat Vaasa 65200 Finland;

    Univ Porto Fac Engn P-4200465 Porto Portugal|INESC TEC P-4200465 Porto Portugal;

  • 收录信息
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    Retail energy market; Demand response; Mixed-integer linear programming; Energy hub; Combined heat and power;

    机译:零售能源市场;需求响应;混合整数线性规划;能量枢纽;综合热量和力量;

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