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Vertical integration, credit ratings and retail price settings in energy-only markets: Navigating the Resource Adequacy problem

机译:仅能源市场中的垂直整合,信用等级和零售价格设置:解决资源充足性问题

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摘要

Energy-only markets are prone to the Resource Adequacy problem, i.e. the timely entry of new plant. The reason for this is that competitive energy-only markets struggle to be remunerative given reliability constraints and market price caps. Historically, Australia's 45,000 MW National Electricity Market has managed to navigate this well understood problem, albeit with government entities directly or indirectly responsible for a surprisingly large 73% of all new plant investments to 2007. But government involvement in direct investment has now ceased. So what will enable the industry to navigate the Resource Adequacy problem into the future? Quite simply, industrial organisation, the presence of merchant utilities with investment-grade credit ratings and setting any regulated retail prices or 'price to beat' with an LRMC floor.
机译:仅能源市场容易出现资源充足性问题,即及时进入新工厂。原因是,鉴于可靠性限制和市场价格上限,竞争激烈的纯能源市场难以获得报酬。从历史上看,澳大利亚的45,000兆瓦国家电力市场设法解决了这个众所周知的问题,尽管到2007年,政府实体直接或间接地负责了所有新电厂投资中惊人的73%。但是,政府对直接投资的参与现已停止。那么,什么将使行业能够在未来解决资源充足性问题呢?简而言之,就是工业组织,具有投资级信用评级的商户公用事业公司,并设定任何受监管的零售价格或“最低价格”以LRMC为底线。

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