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The hard problem

机译:难题

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"I think, therefore I am." Rene Descartes' aphorism has become a cliche. But it cuts to the core of perhaps the greatest question posed to science: what is consciousness? The other phenomena described in this series of briefs-time and space, matter and energy, even life itself-look tractable. They can be measured and objectified, and thus theorised about. Consciousness, by contrast, is subjective. As Descartes' observation suggests, a conscious being knows he is conscious. But he cannot know that any other being is. Other apparently conscious individuals might be zombies programmed to behave as if they were conscious, without actually being so. In reality, it is unlikely that even those who advance this proposition truly believe it, as far as their fellow humans are concerned. Cross the species barrier, however, and matters become muddier. Are chimpanzees conscious? Dogs? Codfish? Bees? It is hard to know how to ask them the question in a meaningful way.
机译:“我思故我在。”雷内·笛卡尔(Rene Descartes)的格言已成为陈词滥调。但这切入了可能对科学提出的最大问题的核心:意识是什么?这一系列简报中描述的其他现象-时间和空间,物质和能量,甚至生命本身看起来都很讨人喜欢。可以对它们进行度量和客观化,从而进行理论化。相比之下,意识是主观的。正如笛卡尔的观察所暗示的,一个有意识的人知道他是有意识的。但是他不知道还有其他存在。其他看似有意识的人可能是被编程为看起来像有意识的僵尸,而实际上并非如此。实际上,就同胞而言,即使是那些提出这一主张的人也不大可能真正相信这一主张。但是,越过物种障碍,事情变得更加泥泞。黑猩猩有意识吗?小狗?鳕鱼?蜜蜂?很难知道如何以有意义的方式问他们这个问题。

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    《The economist》 |2015年第8955期|72-73|共2页
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