We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy et al. (Econ Theory 18, 321–332, 2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis et al. in Econ Theory 21, 495–526, 2002). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (Econ Theory 18, 321–332, 2001) are still valid without free-disposal. Then, motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution, we adapt the incentive compatibility property introduced in Krasa and Yannelis (Econometrica 62, 881–900, 1994) and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of competitive or core allocations are enforceable.
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机译：我们认为交换经济具有连续的主体和关于有限多个自然状态的差异信息。 Einy等人证明了这一点。 （Econ Theory 18，321–332，2001），如果我们允许在市场清算（可行性）约束条件下自由处置，那么不可还原的经济将具有竞争性（或瓦尔拉斯期望）均衡，此外，竞争性均衡分配的集合也是重合的与私有核心。但是，当通过自由处置定义可行性时，竞争性均衡分配可能与激励兼容，合同可能无法强制执行（例如，参见Glycopantis等，Econ Theory 21，495-526，2002）。这是考虑具有确切可行性的平衡解的主要动机。我们首先证明了Einy等人的结果。 （经济理论18，321–332，2001）在没有自由处置的情况下仍然有效。然后，受合同执行问题的启发，我们采用了Krasa和Yannelis（Econometrica 62，881–900，1994）中引入的激励相容性属性，并证明了每个Pareto最优精确可行分配都是激励相容的，这意味着竞争性或核心分配是可强制执行的。
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