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Managerial Ownership, Leverage and Dividend Policies: Empirical Evidence from Vietnam’s Listed Firms

机译:管理所有权,利用和股息政策:来自越南上市公司的经验证据

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The purpose of this paper is to examine the interrelationship among managerial ownership, leverage and dividend policies. The analysis is performed using three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimation on a sample of 81 listed firms on HCM City Stock Exchange (HOSE) during the period 2007–2012. The empirical results indicate that managerial ownership has a negative relationship with leverage. This finfing is supported by Agency Theory. Also, the results provide strong support for Pecking Order Theory, which suggests that there is a negative relationship between leverage and dividend. However, contrary to expectations, managerial ownership is found to have positive impact on dividend. It means that companies with higher levels of managerial holdings are consciously choosing higher level of dividends.
机译:本文的目的是审查管理层所有权,杠杆和股息政策之间的相互关系。 在2007 - 2012年期间,使用三阶段最小二乘(3SL)估计的三级最小二乘(3SL)估计进行了81个上市公司的样本。 经验结果表明,管理所有权与杠杆作用具有负面关系。 该Finfing由机构理论支持。 此外,结果为啄食订单理论提供了强有力的支持,这表明杠杆和股息之间存在负面关系。 然而,与期望相反,发现管理所有权对股息具有积极影响。 这意味着管理持有水平较高的公司在有意识地选择更高水平的股息。

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