In recent years, for the purpose of solving the problem regarding environment protection and resource saving, certain measures and policies have been promoted to establish a reverse supply chains (RSCs) with material flows from col- lection of used products to reuse the recycled parts in production of products. It is necessary to analyze behaviors of RSC members to determine the optimal operation. This paper discusses a RSC with a retailer and a manufacturer and verifies the behavior strategies of RSC members which may change over time in response to changes parameters re- lated to the recycling promotion activity in RSC. A retailer takes two behaviors: cooperation/non-cooperation in recy- cling promotion activity. A manufacturer takes two behaviors: monitoring/non-monitoring of behaviors of the retailer. Evolutionary game theory combining the evolutionary theory of Darwin with game theory is adopted to clarify ana- lytically evolutionary outcomes driven by a change in each behavior of RSC members over time. The evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) for RSC members’ behaviors are derived by using the replicator dynamics. The analysis nu- merically demonstrates how parameters of the recycling promotion activity: (i) sale promotion cost, (ii) monitoring cost, (iii) compensation and (iv) penalty cost affect the judgment of ESSs of behaviors of RSC members.
展开▼
