Quantification in Experimental Psychology and Pragmatic Epistemology: Tension Between the Scientific Imperative and the Social Imperative

摘要

This article is an opinion article that criticizes the usual practice in quantitative psychology.Our development seeks to link a (pragmatic) critique of measurement and statistical modeling,by considering that the critique must firstly focus on the current social framework of scientificproduction.The mainstream of quantification in experimental psychology continues to generally use astandardized design, labeled statistical positivism (Gigerenzer, 1990b). Quantification requiresquantitative measures. Most articles using such measures do so as if these attributes could bemeasured like the objects studied in physics. Based on these measures, statistical models are usedwith different problems: (1) confusion between reality, concepts, and variables; (2) errors in theanalysis or interpretation of statistical models; and (3) normative vision of the model that neglectssingularities and the interdependence of individuals. Criticism of the positivist claims of empiricalstudies in psychology has been around for a long time. Why does experimental psychology continueto proceed as if this critique did not exist? The fundamental reason is the social function ofquantitative psychology. Statistical models allow researchers to publish so-called scientifically validresults (publication bias). Beyond the scientific field, scientific results in psychology contribute inthe public space to what Foucault called bio-power (Foucault, 1995): the results of experimentalpsychology not only serve to support public health recommendations but also underpin processesof standardization, control, and regulation.