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How Bad Are Bad Templates? Optimistic Design-Stage Side-Channel Security Evaluation and its Cost

机译:坏模板有多糟糕?乐观设计阶段侧通道安全评估及其成本

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Cryptographic designs are vulnerable to side-channel analysis attacks. Evaluating their security during design stages is of crucial importance. The latter is achieved by very expensive (slow) analog transient-noise simulations over advanced fabrication process technologies. The main challenge of such rigorous security-evaluation analysis lies in the fact that technologies are becoming more and more complex and the physical properties of manufactured devices vary significantly due to process variations. In turn, a detailed security evaluation process imposes exponential time complexity with the circuit-size, the number of physical implementation corners (statistical variations) and the accuracy of the circuit-simulator. Given these circumstances, what is the cost of not exhausting the entire implementation space? In terms of simulation-time complexity, the benefits would clearly be significant; however, we are interested in evaluating the security implications. This question can be formulated for many other interesting side-channel contexts such as for example, how would an attack-outcome vary when the adversary is building a leakage template over one device, i.e., one physical corner, and it performs an evaluation (attack) phase of a device drawn from a different statistical corner? Alternatively, is it safe to assume that a typical (average) corner would represent the worst case in terms of security evaluation or would it be advisable to perform a security evaluation over another specific view? Finally, how would the outcome vary concretely? We ran in-depth experiments to answer these questions in the hope of finding a nice tradeoff between simulation efforts and expertise, and security-evaluation degradation. We evaluate the results utilizing methodologies such as template-attacks with a clear distinction between profiling and attack-phase statistical views. This exemplary view of what an adversary might capture in these scenarios is followed by a more complete statistical evaluation analysis utilizing tools such as the Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence and the Jensen-Shannon (JS) divergence to draw conclusions.
机译:加密设计易受侧通道分析攻击。在设计阶段评估其安全性至关重要。后者是通过高级制造工艺技术的非常昂贵的(慢速)模拟瞬态噪声模拟实现的。这种严谨的安全评估分析的主要挑战在于,由于工艺变化,技术变得越来越复杂,并且制造装置的物理性质随之而变化显着变化。反过来,详细的安全评估过程强加了对指数时间复杂性的电路尺寸,物理实现角数(统计变化)和电路模拟器的准确性。鉴于这些情况,没有耗尽整个实施空间的成本是多少?在模拟时间复杂性方面,益处显然是重要的;但是,我们有兴趣评估安全影响。可以为许多其他有趣的侧通道上下文制定这个问题,例如,当对手在一个设备上构建泄漏模板时,攻击结果将如何变化,即一个物理角,并且执行评估(攻击)从不同的统计角绘制的设备的阶段?或者,可以安全地假设典型(平均)角在安全评估方面代表最坏的情况,或者建议在另一个特定视图上执行安全评估吗?最后,结果如何具体变化?我们在深入的实验中努力回答这些问题,希望在模拟努力和专业知识和安全评估下降之间找到一个很好的权衡。我们利用模板攻击等方法评估结果,在分析和攻击阶段统计视图之间明确区分。这种情况下可能在这些场景中捕获的这种示例性观点是利用诸如Kullback&Ndash的工具进行更完整的统计评估分析; Leibler(KL)发散和Jensen-Shannon(JS)发散,以得出结论。

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