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Economic policy uncertainty and executive turnover

机译:经济政策不确定性和行政营业额

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This paper examines whether economic uncertainty increases executive turnover. The negative perception perspective and business change theory suggest that executives are more likely to leave their jobs during periods of corporate distress. However, the additive effects of internal and external risk are thought to prompt firms to carefully consider executive turnover, thereby reducing the likelihood of executive changes. Based on the literature, we propose a check-and-balance hypothesis for the relationship between external uncertainty and executive change, according to which the optimal superposition of the internal and external risks stemming from increased external uncertainty would be to avoid a wave of executive departures. Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2019 and the China economic policy uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2013), we examine the impact of economic policy uncertainty on executive turnover and our results support the check-and-balance hypothesis. Our findings enhance our understanding of how economic policy uncertainty affects executive turnover, and enrich the literature on corporate risk management and strategic management.
机译:本文探讨了经济不确定性是否增加了行政营业额。负面看法视角和业务变革理论表明,高管在企业遇险时更有可能离开工作。然而,内部和外部风险的添加剂效应被认为是迅速考虑行政营业额的促使公司,从而降低执行变化的可能性。根据文献,我们提出了对外部不确定性和行政变革之间的关系的支票和平衡假设,其内部和外部风险源于增加的外部不确定性,是为了避免一波行政偏离浪潮。从2010年到2019年使用中国A股上市公司和Baker等人的中国经济政策不确定性指数。 (2013年),我们研究经济政策不确定性对执行营业额的影响,我们的结果支持支票和平衡假设。我们的调查结果提高了我们对经济政策不确定性如何影响行政营业额的理解,并丰富了企业风险管理和战略管理的文献。

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