Low-cost data partitioning and encrypted backup scheme for defending against co-resident attacks

摘要

Aiming at preventing user data leakage and the damage that is caused by co-resident attacks in the cloud environment, a data partitioning and encryption backup (PXE) scheme is proposed. After the data have been divided into blocks, the data are backed up using the XOR operation between the data. Then, the backup data are encrypted using a random string. Compared with the existing scheme, the proposed scheme resolves the conflict between data security and survivability via encrypted backup. At the same time, because the XOR-encrypted backup causes multiple data blocks to share the same backup data, the storage overhead of the user is reduced. In this paper, existing probabilistic models are used to compare the performances of an existing scheme and the PXE scheme in terms of data security, data survivability and user storage overhead, and the overall performances of the two schemes in terms of these three aspects that are compared using control variables. Finally, the experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the PXE scheme at improving user data security and survivability and reducing user storage overhead.