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Source selection problem of competitive power plants under government intervention: a game theory approach

机译:政府干预下竞争性电厂的资源选择问题:博弈论方法

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Pollution and environmental protection in the present century are extremely significant global problems. Power plants as the largest pollution emitting industry have been the cause of a great deal of scientific researches. The fuel or source type used to generate electricity by the power plants plays an important role in the amount of pollution produced. Governments should take visible actions to promote green fuel. These actions are often called the governmental financial interventions that include legislations such as green subsidiaries and taxes. In this paper, by considering the government role in the competition of two power plants, we propose a game theoretical model that will help the government to determine the optimal taxes and subsidies. The numerical examples demonstrate how government could intervene in a competitive market of electricity to achieve the environmental objectives and how power plants maximize their utilities in each energy source. The results also reveal that the government’s taxes and subsidiaries effectively influence the selected fuel types of power plants in the competitive market.
机译:本世纪的污染和环境保护是极为重要的全球性问题。作为最大的污染排放产业的发电厂已引起大量科学研究。发电厂用于发电的燃料或能源类型在产生的污染量中起重要作用。政府应该采取明显的行动来促进绿色燃料。这些行动通常被称为政府金融干预措施,其中包括绿色子公司和税收等立法。在本文中,通过考虑政府在两个电厂竞争中的作用,我们提出了一种博弈论模型,该模型将帮助政府确定最优的税收和补贴。数值示例说明了政府如何干预竞争性的电力市场以实现环境目标,以及电厂如何在每种能源中最大化其效用。研究结果还表明,政府的税收和子公司在竞争激烈的市场中有效影响了电厂选定的燃料类型。

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