A Game Analysis of Trade Dumping and Antidumping

摘要

This paper develops game theoretical models to study the interactive, competitive plays and relevant decision making regarding the dumping and antidumping actions between an importing nation and an exporting nation. The latter considers potentially dumping its product in the domestic market of the former, while the former attempts to protect its market and its domestic firms from exiting the market by implementing necessary trading strategies. Understanding how to deal with potential intruders, when to take actions, and what appropriate actions to take under different sets of conditions is very crucial both theoretically and practically, because countermeasures may or may not be effective depending on what conditions one is constrained with. The theoretical framework, established in this paper, will provide a better understanding of anti-dumping policies and their implications for regulators, policy makers, managers, and academicians, while the results developed herein can be readily employed in real-life scenarios, making this work practically useful for understanding how international trade conflicts could be handled effectively.