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首页> 外文期刊>The Journal of Graduate Medical Education >Viewpoint From 2 Graduate Medical Education Deans Application Overload in the Residency Match Process
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Viewpoint From 2 Graduate Medical Education Deans Application Overload in the Residency Match Process

机译:来自2个研究生医学教育学院院长的观点,在居住匹配过程中应用程序超载

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What is the application cycle experience for current program directors? During recruitment, program directors (PDs) embody roles that run the gamut from marketing director, webmaster, adviser, and advocate to used-car salesman, interrogator, proud parent, and spin doctor. The residency application process begins immediately after the previous year's Match cycle (figure). Initially, PDs examine the previous Match for (1) matched programs of ranked applicants; (2) characteristics of matched and unmatched ranked applicants; (3) applicant characteristics and timing of interview cancellations; (4) lowest-ranked Match compared with previous years; (5) recruitment communication, marketing, faculty and resident involvement, and interviews; and (6) overall costs. Next, applicants from a PD's home institution schedule appointments with the PD to confirm information provided by student affairs deans, clerkship directors,1 and various websites regarding the application process. View larger version (27K) figureRecruitment Cycle for a Program Director;Do programs benefit from a high applicant to position ratio? When applications outnumber positions by 120 to 1, as typically occurs for competitive programs, it may appear that programs have the advantage in the balance between supply and demand. However, by dividing the process into 2 phases, the application and the interview, the balance shifts. In the earlier anesthesiology example, a subset of roughly 150 top-tier candidates apply and are granted the vast majority of interviews to the same set of regional, peer schools with similar demographics. Consequently, demand outstrips supply once programs reach the interview phase, as roughly 350 positions are available at peer-grouped programs. Applicants offered interviews may keep their interview slots until the last minute, which prevents other candidates from being interviewed. This puts 200 positions at risk for not matching. Moreover, applicants who are not top tier are unnecessarily shunted to less competitive programs or a non-match. Because of interview hoarding by top applicants, some PDs report forgoing interview offers to top applicants who historically have matched elsewhere and instead favor lower-tier candidates.2 Another unintended consequence of overapplying is the urgency for PDs to offer early interviews. The PDs know that applicants apply to far more programs than they will ultimately visit for an interview. To pitch their program and avoid cancellations, PDs make early interview offers, prior to the release of the Medical Student Performance Evaluation (MSPE), with interview dates as early as October. Early interview offers prevent holistic review, however, because decisions are made based on incomplete applications.;Why are medical students applying to an increasing number of residency programs? Application creep occurs primarily because “we” tell students to apply to more programs. We, the student affairs deans, look at the prior year application numbers and figuratively push down on the accelerator. We, the accreditation and clinical association bodies, forge an aggressive campaign for Medicare dollars based on the premise of a looming graduate medical education position shortfall. We, the organizations that sponsor the Match and application process, fail to implement effective process improvements to curb the overapplying frenzy despite early warnings that the process is out of control. Other reasons include the ease of applying, lack of fourth-year curriculum requirements, low-intensity program interviews, and basic game theory economics. The ease of the application process leads to overapplying when adding programs to an application list requires only a few clicks on the common application.3 Further, the personal statement does not push students to engage in thoughtful responses to questions. Medical schools and residency programs deserve some blame as well. At 1 school in 2014–2015, only 40% of the students took a clini
机译:当前的程序主管的应用程序周期经验是什么?在招聘过程中,程序主管(PD)扮演着从营销主管,网站管理员,顾问,拥护者到二手车推销员,审问者,骄傲的父母和旋转医生的角色。在上一年的比赛周期(图)之后,居民申请程序立即开始。最初,PD会针对(1)个排名申请人的匹配程序检查先前的Match; (2)排名匹配和不匹配的申请人的特征; (三)申请人特点和面试取消时机; (4)与往年相比排名最低的比赛; (5)招聘沟通,市场营销,教职员工参与以及面试; (6)总成本。接下来,来自PD的本国机构的申请人与PD安排约会,以确认学生事务主任,业务主管1和各种网站提供的有关申请过程的信息。查看大图(27K)数字计划主管的招聘周期;计划是否会从高申请人与职位比例中受益?当应用程序的位置数比竞争程序的位置数多120个到1个时,程序似乎在供求之间保持平衡方面具有优势。但是,通过将流程分为申请和面试两个阶段,平衡发生了变化。在较早的麻醉学示例中,大约有150名顶级候选人的子集申请并获得了对具有相似人口统计特征的同一组地区性,同等学校的绝大多数面试机会。因此,一旦计划进入面试阶段,需求就会超过供应,因为同级小组计划中大约有350个职位。提供面试的申请人可以将其面试时间保留到最后一分钟,以防止其他候选人被面试。这使200个职位面临不匹配的风险。而且,非顶级申请人不必要地被分流到竞争性较低的计划或不匹配的计划。由于顶级申请人的面试ho积,一些PD向以前在其他地方匹配过而又偏爱低层候选人的顶级申请人报告了放弃的面试优惠。2过度申请的另一个意料之外的结果是,PD迫切需要提早进行面试。 PD知道,与最终访问面试者相比,申请人申请的程序要多得多。为了推销他们的计划并避免被取消,PD在医学生表现评估(MSPE)发布之前提出了早期面试要约,面试日期最早是10月。但是,由于面试是基于不完整的申请做出的,因此早期面试提供的内容会阻止整体审查。为什么医科学生为什么要申请越来越多的居住计划?出现应用蠕变的主要原因是“我们”告诉学生申请更多程序。我们,学生事务部主任,查看上一年的申请号,然后形象地推下加速器。我们,认证和临床协会机构,在迫在眉睫的研究生医学教育职位紧缺的前提下,为争取Medicare美元而开展了激进的运动。我们是赞助“比赛和申请”流程的组织,尽管有早期警告称该流程已失控,但仍未能实施有效的流程改进以遏制过度申请的狂潮。其他原因包括易于应用,缺乏四年级课程要求,缺乏强度的程序面试以及基本博弈论经济学。当将程序添加到应用程序列表中时,只需单击几次通用应用程序即可简化申请程序,从而导致申请过度。3此外,个人陈述并不会促使学生对问题进行认真思考。医学院和居留计划也应受到谴责。在2014年至2015年的一所学校中,只有40%的学生参加了诊所

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