An efficient strongly secure authenticated key exchange protocol without random oracles

摘要

Since the introduction of extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) security model for two‐party key exchange, many protocols have been proposed to provide eCK security. However, most of those protocols are provably secure in the random oracle model or rely on special design technique, which is well known as the NAXOS trick. In contrast to previous schemes, we present an eCK secure protocol in the standard model, without NAXOS trick and without knowledge of secret key assumption for public key registration. The security proof of our scheme is based on standard pairing assumption, collision‐resistant hash functions, Bilinear Decision Diffie–Hellman and Decision Linear Diffie–Hellman assumptions, and pseudo‐random functions with pairwise independent random source. Although our proposed protocol is based on bilinear groups, it does not require any pairing operation during key exchange procedure. Copyright ? 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. We present an eCK secure protocol in the standard model, without NAXOS trick and without the knowledge of secret key assumption for public key registration. The security proof of our scheme is based on standard pairing assumption, collision resistant hash functions, bilinear decision Diffie‐Hellman and decision linear Diffie‐Hellman assumptions, and pseudo‐random functions with pairwise‐independent random source. Although our proposed protocol is based on bilinear groups, it does not require any pairing operation during key exchange procedure.