首页> 外文期刊>Risk Governance & Control: Financial Markets & Institutions >CHASING THE DEAL WITH THE MONEY: MEASURING THE REQUIRED RISK PREMIUM AND EXPECTED ABNORMAL RETURNS OF PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS TO MAXIMIZE THEIR INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN
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CHASING THE DEAL WITH THE MONEY: MEASURING THE REQUIRED RISK PREMIUM AND EXPECTED ABNORMAL RETURNS OF PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS TO MAXIMIZE THEIR INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN

机译:用金钱追逐交易:衡量所需的风险溢价和私募股权基金的预期异常收益,以最大限度地提高其内部收益率

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A number of scholars of private equity (“PE”) have attempted to assess the ex-post returns, or performance, of PEs by adopting an ex-post perspective of asset pricing. In doing so a set of phenomena has been recognized that is thought to be specific to the PE sector, such as “money-chasing deal phenomenon” (Gompers and Lerner, 2000) and “performance persistence” (Lerner and Schoar, 2005). However, based on their continuing use of an ex-post perspective, few scholars have paid attention to the possible extent to which these and other PE phenomena may affect expected returns from PE investments. To address this problem this article draws on an ex-ante perspective of investment decision-making in suggesting how a number of drivers and factors of PE phenomena may produce “abnormal returns”, and that each of those drivers and factors should therefore be considered in accurately assessing the required risk premium and expected abnormal returns of PE investments. In making these contributions we examined a private equity investment of a regional PE in Italy and administered a telephone questionnaire to 40 PEs in Italy and the UK and found principally that while size is the most important driver in producing abnormal returns illiquidity alone cannot explain the expected returns of PE investments (cf. Franzoni et al., 2012). Based on our findings we developed a predictive model of PE decision-making that draws on an ex-ante perspective of asset pricing and takes into account PE phenomena and abnormal returns. This model extends the work of Franzoni et al. (2012), Jegadeesh et al. (2009), and Korteweg and Sorensen (2010) who did not consider the possible influence of PE phenomena in decision-making and will also help PE managers in making better-informed decisions.
机译:许多私募股权(“ PE”)学者试图通过采用事后资产定价的观点来评估PE的事后收益或绩效。通过这样做,人们认识到了一系列现象,这些现象被认为是特定于私募股权部门的,例如“追钱交易现象”(Gompers和Lerner,2000年)和“绩效持久性”(Lerner和Schoar,2005年)。但是,基于他们继续使用事后观点的观点,很少有学者关注这些及其他体育现象可能影响体育投资预期收益的可能性。为了解决这个问题,本文借鉴了投资决策的事前观点,提出了PE现象的多种驱动因素和因素如何产生“超额收益”,因此,应当考虑这些驱动因素和因素中的每一个。准确评估私募股权投资所需的风险溢价和预期的异常收益。在做出这些贡献时,我们检查了意大利某地区私募股权公司的私募股权投资,并向意大利和英国的40家私募股权公司进行了电话问卷调查,主要发现,规模是产生异常收益的最重要驱动力,仅流动性不足不能解释预期私募股权投资的回报(参见Franzoni等,2012)。根据我们的发现,我们开发了PE决策的预测模型,该模型借鉴了资产定价的事前观点,并考虑了PE现象和超额收益。该模型扩展了Franzoni等人的工作。 (2012),Jegadeesh等。 (2009)和Korteweg and Sorensen(2010),他们没有考虑体育现象对决策的可能影响,也将帮助体育经理制定更明智的决策。

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