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首页> 外文期刊>Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology >On DNA Signatures, their Dual-Use Potential for GMO Counterfeiting, and a Cyber-based Security Solution
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On DNA Signatures, their Dual-Use Potential for GMO Counterfeiting, and a Cyber-based Security Solution

机译:关于DNA签名,其对GMO仿冒的双重使用潜力以及基于网络的安全解决方案

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This study investigates the role and functionality of special nucleotide sequences (DNA signatures) to detect the presence of an organism and to distinguish it from all others. After highlighting vulnerabilities of the prevalent DNA signature paradigm for the identification of agricultural genetically modified (GM) organisms it will be argued that these so-called signatures really are no signatures at all - when compared to the notion of traditional (handwritten) signatures and their generalizations in the modern (digital) world. It is suggested that a recent contamination event of an unauthorized GM Bacillus subtilis strain (Paracchini et al. (2017)) in Europe could have been - or the same way could be - the consequence of exploiting gaps of prevailing DNA signatures. Moreover, a recent study (Mueller (2019)) proposes that such DNA signatures may intentionally be exploited to support the counterfeiting or even weaponization of GM organisms (GMOs). These concerns mandate a re-conceptualization of how DNA signatures need to be realized. After identifying central issues of the new vulnerabilities and overlying them with practical challenges that bio-cyber hackers would be facing, recommendations are made how DNA signatures may be enhanced. To overcome the core problem of signature transferability in bioengineered mediums, it is necessary that the identifier needs to remain secret during the entire verification process. On the other hand, however, the goal of DNA signatures is to enable public verifiability, leading to a paradoxical dilemma. It is shown that this can be addressed with ideas that underlie special cryptographic signatures, in particular those of ‘zero-knowledge’ and ‘invisibility.’ This means more than mere signature hiding, but relies on a knowledge-based proof and differentiation of a secret (here, as assigned to specific clones) which can be realized without explicit demonstration of that secret. A reconceptualization of these principles can be used in form of a combined (digital and physical) method to establish confidentiality and prevent un-impersonation of the manufacturer. As a result, this helps mitigate the circulation of possibly hazardous GMO counterfeits and also addresses the situation whereby attackers try to blame producers for deliberately implanting illicit adulterations hidden within authorized GMOs.
机译:这项研究调查了特殊核苷酸序列(DNA签名)的作用和功能,以检测生物体的存在并将其与所有其他生物区分开。在强调了普遍存在的DNA签名范式用于识别农业转基因(GM)生物的脆弱性之后,我们将论证这些所谓的签名实际上根本不是签名-与传统(手写)签名及其概念相比现代(数字)世界中的概括。有人建议,欧洲最近发生的未经授权的枯草芽孢杆菌枯草芽孢杆菌菌株的污染事件(Paracchini et al。(2017))可能是-或以相同的方式-是利用主要DNA标记缺口的结果。此外,最近的一项研究(Mueller(2019))建议可以有意利用此类DNA签名来支持伪造甚至是转基因生物(GMO)的武器化。这些问题要求重新概念化如何实现DNA签名。在确定了新漏洞的核心问题并解决了生物网络黑客将面临的实际挑战之后,提出了如何增强DNA签名的建议。为了克服生物工程介质中签名可转移性的核心问题,有必要在整个验证过程中将标识符保持秘密。但是,另一方面,DNA签名的目标是实现公共可验证性,从而导致自相矛盾。结果表明,这可以通过特殊加密签名(特别是“零知识”和“隐形”)基础的思想来解决。这不仅仅意味着隐藏签名,还依赖于基于知识的证明和区分。秘密(在此已分配给特定克隆),无需显式证明该秘密即可实现。这些原则的重新概念化可以以组合(数字和物理)方法的形式使用,以建立机密性并防止假冒制造商。结果,这有助于减轻可能有害的GMO假冒产品的流通,还解决了攻击者试图责怪生产者故意植入隐藏在授权GMO中的非法掺假的情况。

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