The use of nudge theory by non-governmental organizations and governments as a means to encourage charitable donations in order to address global poverty has been the subject of much recent enthusiasm. Supporters argue that nudges aimed at altering behaviour are much less complex and normatively problematic than attempts to alter attitudes towards global poverty. This paper aims to challenge these assumptions. In order to do so, it identifies problems and shortcomings of the nudge approach, suggesting we should look again at alternative strategies. The argument consists of three parts. Section 1 outlines the nudge approach, dividing nudges into three distinct categories. Nudges in the first category, which operate through simple information provision, face no compelling objections as a means to motivate charitable giving. Section 2 examines nudges in the third category, typically considered the most pernicious form of nudge in the critical literature. As these nudges aim to bypass reflection, their use faces distinct normative problems in the context of global poverty. The third section, comprising the bulk of the discussion, examines the complex case presented by second-category nudges, which capitalize on prudential sources of motivation in order to motivate action to address global poverty. It argues that, although such cases may appear straightforward instances of favouring good outcomes over good motives, the reality is much more complex. Altering behaviour provides no easy substitute for the complex and vital task of altering attitudes towards global poverty.
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