Service and Selling Effort Decisions in a Two-Echelon Decentralized Supply Chain

摘要

This paper investigates the service and sellingeffort decisions of a product in a two-echelon supply chainwith one manufacturer and one retailer. Assuming that themarket demand is dependent on the retail price, service levelprovided by the manufacturer and selling effort chosen by theretailer, three different kinds of game structures areconsidered, i.e., Manufacturer-Stackelberg, RetailerStackelberg and Vertical-Nash, and their optimal solutions arealso derived. Finally, the results of the proposed models areanalyzed via a numerical example. It is shown that themanufacturer and the retailer make the largest profits in theVertical-Nash and Retailer-Stackelberg games, respectively,and the customer obtains the highest service level in theRetailer-Stackelberg game.