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Secure Computation with Information Leaking to an Adversary

机译:信息泄露给对手的安全计算

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Assume that Alice is running a program P on a RAM, and an adversary Bob would like to get some information about the input or output of the program. At each time, during the execution of P, Bob is able to see the addresses of the memory cells involved in the instruction which is executed and the name of the instruction. In addition to this, at certain times, Bob can even see the contents of all of the memory cells involved in the instruction. We will call a time when this happens a compromised time. Bob can choose the compromised times in an adaptive way, that is, immediately before the instruction at time t is executed, Bob, using all of the information at his disposal, can decide whether time t will be compromised or not. The only restriction on his choice is, that among m consecutive instructions there can be at most m whose time is compromised, where 0 is a small constant. We show that if m=clogn , where c0 is a large constant, then for each program P, using n memory cells and time T=O(poly(n)), Alice can construct a functionally equivalent program P, such that the probability that Bob gets any nontrivial information about the input of P is negligible, and the time and space requirements of P grows, compared to P, only by a factor of poly(logn). We assume that the program P gets its input in an encoded form, namely each input bit b is encoded by a random 01 -sequence of length m whose parity is b. The output bits must be encoded by P in a similar way. As part of the proof of the result described above we also construct for all positive integers m, and for all boolean circuits C of size n a functionally equivalent circuit C of size O(npoly(m)) with the following properties. Assume that an adversary can observe each bit going through the wires of the circuit C independently with a probability of , where 0 is a small constant, and each input/output bit of C is encoded by m input/output bits of C the same way as described above for RAMs. Then, such an adversary, while observing C, can get any information about the input/output of the circuit C only with a probability of ne?cm, where c0 is a constant.
机译:假设Alice在RAM上运行程序P,而对手Bob想要获取有关程序输入或输出的一些信息。在每次执行P的过程中,Bob都能看到所执行的指令所涉及的存储单元的地址以及该指令的名称。除此之外,在某些时候,Bob甚至可以看到指令中涉及的所有存储单元的内容。我们将称其为折衷时间。鲍勃可以以自适应方式选择折衷时间,也就是说,紧接在时间t的指令执行之前,鲍勃使用他掌握的所有信息,可以决定是否要折衷时间t。对他的选择的唯一限制是,在m个连续的指令中,最多可以有m个其时间受到影响,其中0是一个小常数。我们表明,如果m = clogn,其中c0是一个大常数,则对于每个程序P,使用n个存储单元和时间T = O(poly(n)),Alice可以构造一个功能上等效的程序P,从而使概率为Bob获得的关于P输入的任何重要信息都可以忽略不计,并且与P相比,P的时间和空间需求仅增长了poly(logn)倍。我们假设程序P以编码形式获取其输入,即每个输入位b由奇偶性为b的长度为m的01随机序列编码。输出位必须以类似的方式由P编码。作为上述结果证明的一部分,我们还为所有正整数m和大小为n的所有布尔电路C构造了具有以下特性的大小为O(npoly(m))的功能等效电路C。假设对手可以观察到每个位以C的概率独立通过电路C的导线,其中0是一个小常数,并且C的每个输入/输出位由C的m个输入/输出位以相同的方式编码如上文针对RAM所述。然后,这样的对手在观察C的同时,只能以ne?cm的概率获得关于电路C的输入/输出的任何信息,其中c0是一个常数。

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