A New Solution to the Puzzle of Fifty-Fifty Split in Sharecropping

摘要

This paper mainly discusses the puzzle of fifty-fifty split in sharecropping through an improved principal-agent moral hazard framework. Greatly different from the existing literature, this paper finds a new solution to the puzzle of fifty-fifty split in sharecropping. Equal division between the landowner and the tenant regardless of the land’s fertility is incentive compatible, and at the same time the landowner could lease out more fertile land to the relational tenant to improve his utility by using the right of priority. Although fifty-fifty split in sharecropping happens to be fair and comes to be taken for granted as a norm, it is an efficient contractual arrangement in essence.Sa?etakOvaj rad uglavnom analizira zagonetku dijeljenja po pola u napoli?arenju putem pobolj?anog okvira moralnog rizika na relaciji principal-agent. Vrlo razli?it od postoje?e literature, ovaj rad nalazi novo rje?enje zagonetke podjele po pola u napoli?arenju. Jednaka podjela izme?u vlasnika zemlje i zakupca bez obzira na plodnost zemlje je kompatibilna s poticajima dok istovremeno vlasnik zemlje mo?e iznajmiti plodniju zemlju odnosnom zakupcu kako bi pobolj?ao svoj polo?aj koriste?i pravo prvenstva. Iako je podjela pola-pola u napoli?arenju pravedna i uglavnom se uzima zdravo za gotovo kao norma, u biti je to efikasan ugovorni odnos.