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A signaling model of foreign direct investment attraction

机译:外商直接投资吸引力的信号模型

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Foreign direct investors face uncertainty about government's type of the host country. In a two period game, we allow the host country's government to mitigate such uncertainty by sending a signal through fiscal policy. Our main finding states that a populist government may mimic a conservative one in order to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), and this choice depends mainly on its impatience degree and the originally planned FDI stock. We highlight the role of the government's reputation in attracting foreign capital and thus provide some policy implications. Moreover, our model explains why some governments considered to be populist adopt conservative policies in the beginning of its terms of office.
机译:外国直接投资者在政府的东道国类型方面面临不确定性。在两个时期的博弈中,我们允许东道国政府通过财政政策发出信号来减轻这种不确定性。我们的主要发现表明,民粹主义政府可能会模仿一个保守的政府,以吸引外国直接投资(FDI),而这一选择主要取决于其急躁程度和最初计划的FDI存量。我们着重强调政府声誉在吸引外资中的作用,从而提供一些政策含义。此外,我们的模型解释了为什么一些被认为是民粹主义的政府在其任期开始时采取保守的政策。

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