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Outside Director Equity Compensation and the Quality of Analyst Earnings Forecasts

机译:外部董事股权报酬与分析师收入预测的质量

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Purpose : This article investigates how outside directors’ equity compensation affects the quality of analyst earnings forecasts. Design/methodology/approach: The authors implement firm clustered OLS regression with year, quarter, and industry dummies since there may exist biases from firm, year, quarter, and industry specific characteristics. Findings: Using 7,159 firm-year compensation data from ExecuComp, the authors find that the quality of analyst earnings forecasts improves when the proportion of equity compensation awarded to outside directors increases. They also separate equity compensation into stock and option. Their results show consistent improvement: more accurate and less dispersed analyst earnings forecasts. Overall, the findings suggest that the quality of analyst earnings forecasts is better when outside directors are compensated with equity compensation. Research limitations/implications: This study provides empirical evidence of benefit from equity compensation of outside directors in line with existing compensation studies in accounting and finance literature. Unlike a majority of the extant studies, this study examines how the composition of director compensation affects the quality of information which financial analysts produce. Consistent with an argument that equity compensation aligns the interests, outside directors with more equity compensation tend to provide financial information with better quality, the authors document that analysts are likely to provide more accurate and less disperse information. Practi cal implications: For and board members, this study offers an implication that equity compensation could contribute to enhancing their firms’ information environment. In addition, analysts could improve their forecasting performance by following firm monitored by outside directors remunerated with equity compensation. For investors who put much emphasize on the quality of firms’ financial information, the use of equity compensation can be a useful criterion in their investment decision. Originality/value: This study provides empirical evidence of benefit from equity compensation in line with compensation studies in accounting and finance literature. Therefore, equity compensation can be a useful criterion in their decision makings for various parties, including analysts, regulators, and individual investors.
机译:目的:本文研究外部董事的股权补偿如何影响分析师收益预测的质量。设计/方法/方法:由于公司,年,季度和行业的特定特征可能存在偏差,因此作者将公司群集的OLS回归与年,季度和行业的虚拟变量一起使用。研究结果:利用来自ExecuComp的7,159个公司年度报酬数据,作者发现,授予外部董事的股权报酬比例增加时,分析师收入预测的质量也会提高。他们还将股权补偿分为股票和期权。他们的结果显示出持续的改进:更准确,更分散的分析师收益预测。总体而言,调查结果表明,当外部董事获得股权补偿时,分析师的盈利预测质量会更好。研究的局限性/意义:该研究提供了经验证据,表明外部董事的股权报酬与会计和财务文献中的现有报酬研究相一致。与大多数现有研究不同,本研究研究了董事薪酬的构成如何影响财务分析师产生的信息质量。与股权补偿使利益保持一致的观点相一致,拥有更多股权补偿的外部董事往往会提供质量更高的财务信息,作者证明分析师可能会提供更准确且分散程度更低的信息。实际意义:对于董事会成员和董事会成员,本研究表明股权补偿可能有助于改善公司的信息环境。此外,分析师可以通过跟踪有酬劳的外部董事的监督来提高他们的预测业绩。对于那些非常重视公司财务信息质量的投资者而言,使用股权补偿可能是他们进行投资决策的有用标准。独创性/价值:该研究提供了与会计和财务文献中的补偿研究一致的,从股权补偿中受益的经验证据。因此,对于包括分析家,监管机构和个人投资者在内的各方而言,股权补偿可能是他们做出决策时的有用标准。

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