Enforcing Cooperation among Misbehaving Nodes in Ad Hoc Networks Using Shapley Value to Assign Economic Virtual Currency

摘要

Clustering is a major research area in the recent years that is suggested for improving the life expectancy of ad hoc networks. Since the nodes in an ad hoc network are resource constrained they tend to act selfishly and do not cooperate among themselves in performing their services among the clusters. The concept of assigning incentives in the form of virtual currencies to encourage nodes to cooperate for the network services is suggested in existing works. The Vickrey, Clarke and Groves (VCG) mechanism is a game-theoretical approach, used to calculate the incentives to be assigned to nodes to encourage them to be honest of their private information. This study proposes Shapley value based coalition game theory to enforce honest cooperation among the nodes. The solution computes economic incentives to be distributed among the nodes. Empirical and simulation results show that the proposed solution not only assigns economic incentives to enforce cooperation for a common good but also distributes the same fairly among the nodes thereby encouraging them to honestly cooperate in performing the network services.