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The Effect of Reputation to the Moral Hazard in C2C E-Market with Game Theory

机译:声誉对C2C电子市场道德风险的博弈分析

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It is well known that the reputation is the basis of a seller to survive and gain trust from customers in a competitive business environment. But as the existence of information asymmetry between buyer and seller, the moral hazard problem is the key obstacle that impedes the benefits of related shareholders and reduces the efficiency of total market. It is crucial to design a control mechanism to avoid the negative impact of moral hazard. This paper studies the principal and agent relationship between buyer and seller in C2C e-market; because of the influence of information asymmetry, many customers suffered from being cheated by sellers with defective products in practice. These frequent cases will deteriorate long term relationship between sellers and buyers. Here we focus on the analysis of the causes of moral risks and the effect of reputation on oral risk with repeated game theory. The purpose of this paper is to help both firms and customers effectively avoid morality risk and realize a win-win situation.
机译:众所周知,声誉是卖方在竞争激烈的商业环境中生存并赢得客户信任的基础。但是由于买卖双方之间存在信息不对称,道德风险问题成为阻碍相关股东利益,降低整体市场效率的主要障碍。设计一种控制机制以避免道德风险的负面影响至关重要。本文研究了C2C电子市场中买卖双方的委托代理关系。由于信息不对称的影响,许多顾客在实践中都遭受了卖家的欺骗,因为他们欺骗了有缺陷的产品。这些频繁发生的情况将恶化买卖双方之间的长期关系。在这里,我们着重用重复博弈论分析道德风险的原因和声誉对口头风险的影响。本文的目的是帮助公司和客户双方有效地规避道德风险,实现双赢。

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