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Simple Incentives and Group Dependence for Successful Payments for Ecosystem Services Programs: Evidence from an Experimental Game in Rural Lao PDR

机译:对生态系统服务项目成功付款的简单激励和团体依赖性:来自老挝农村的实验性博弈的证据

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Abstract In this article, we use a new game-based tool to evaluate the immediate and longer term behavioral change potential of three different payments for ecosystem services (PES) delivery mechanisms: direct payments for individual performance, direct payments for group performance, and insurance. Results from four rural shifting-cultivation dependent communities in Lao PDR suggest that easily understood group-oriented incentives yield the greatest immediate resource-use reduction and experience less free-riding. Group-based incentives may succeed because they motivate participants to communicate about strategies and coordinate their actions and are perceived as fair. No incentive had a lasting effect after it ceased, but neither did any crowd out the participants’ baseline behavior. Temporary reductions in resource dependence may provide a buffer for development of new livelihoods and longer term change. Games like the one developed here can help policy makers appropriately target environmental incentive programs to local contexts and teach program participants how incentive schemes work.
机译:摘要在本文中,我们使用一种新的基于游戏的工具来评估三种不同的生态系统服务付款(PES)交付机制的短期和长期行为变化潜力:个人绩效的直接支付,团体绩效的直接支付和保险。老挝人民民主共和国四个农村依赖耕种的社区的结果表明,容易理解的面向群体的激励措施可以最大程度地立即减少资源使用,减少搭便车的经历。基于小组的激励措施可能会成功,因为它们可以激励参与者交流策略并协调其行为,并且被认为是公平的。激励措施停止后没有任何持久作用,但也没有任何人挤出参与者的基本行为。暂时减少对资源的依赖可能为新的生计和长期变化的发展提供缓冲。像这里开发的那种游戏可以帮助政策制定者适当地针对当地情况制定环境激励计划,并向计划参与者讲授激励计划的工作方式。

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