Sir Robert Thompson's Lessons for Iraq: Bringing the 'Basic Principles of Counter-Insurgency' into the 21st Century

摘要

In 1966 Robert Thompson published one of the most acclaimed pieces of so-called 'classical' counter-insurgency literature, Defeating Communist Insurgency. The most crucial part of the book is Chapter Four, in which Thompson outlines his five 'Basic Principles of Counter-Insurgency': the government must have a clear political aim; the government must function according with law; the government must have an overall plan; the government must give priority to defeating political subversion; and the government must secure its base areas first. In the face of a resurgence of counter-insurgency (COIN) analysis this paper aims to contemporise Thompson's politically-minded 'Basic Principles' to the management of the outbreak of multiple insurgencies in the immediate post-invasion period in Iraq between 2003 and 2005. This analysis will identify where the American strategy failed, why it contributed to the spiral of violence, and where the alternatives to the subsequent 'surge' lay. The paper does not argue that Thompson's principles hold all the answers to the COIN conundrum, but that his pragmatic acknowledgement of the overtly political nature of insurgencies and the need for legitimacy in operations offers a much needed reminder of COIN fundamentals.